







Citation:	Dehnel, P. (2013). Hegelian Thought in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Hegel-










Piotr Dehnel, Bielany Wrocławskie
Hegelian THougHT in ConTemporary analyTiC pHilosopHy
1.
Let me start with a general remark: Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom’s very influential book, 
fundamental for the current analytic philosophy, has been characterized as »an attempt to usher 
analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage«.1 This is interesting as long as we bear 
in mind that this philosophy originated precisely in opposition to Hegelian idealism. Bertrand Rus-
sell wrote in My Philosophical Development:
»It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. 
Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think that the first published 
account of the new philosophy was Moore’s article in Mind on The Nature of Judgment. 
Although neither he nor I would now adhere to all doctrines in this article, I, and I think 
he, would still agree with its negative part – i. e. with the doctrine that fact is in general 
independent of experience. I think that Moore was most concerned with the rejection of 
idealism, while I was most interested in the rejection of monism. The two were, however 
closely connected. They were connected through the doctrine as to relations, which Bradley 
had distilled out of the philosophy of Hegel«.2 
In opposition to Bradley’s philosophy, Russell called his position logical atomism. The contradic-
tion between Bradley-like Hegelian monism and logical atomism was basically reduced by Russell 
to the question of whether there are many different truths or only one Truth. Of course, for Hegel, 
»Das Wahre ist das Ganze«. Can this statement of the German philosopher be valid again? 
 I would not venture to answer this. Nevertheless, it is possible to point out some intermediary 
stages on the analytical way from Kant to Hegel. One of them would be, I think, Wilfired Sellars’s 
attack on what he describes as the Myth of the Given. Developed in his Empiricism and the Phi-
losophy of Mind (1956, 1963), Sellars’s critique can be read as a critique of the twentieth century 
empiricism represented by, among others, B. Russell, G. Moore, or J. A. Ayer. According to this 
stance, we should base our knowledge on the simplest irreducible elements, namely sense data. 
However, when Sellars speaks of the given, he means not only the concept of sense data. Many 
things have been said to be »given«; besides sense data, there are universals, propositions, first 
principles, and intuitions. Consequently, we can speak about the framework of givenness.3 Accor-
ding to Sellars, the critique of sense-datum theories is only the first step in a general critique of the 
entire framework of givenness. The framework relies on the assumption that there are epistemic 
primitives – beliefs or other mental states that have some positive epistemic status, but they are 
1 Richard Rorty, »Introduction«, in: Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, 
London 1997, 8.
2 Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, London 1975, 42.
3 Cf., Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 14.
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non-inferential, conceptually simple and epistemically independent and efficacious. Such simple 
and independent knowledge can serve as the foundation for the rest of our knowledge.
 The point of Sellars’s critique is his attack on concepts of direct knowledge, because the given 
is given to us directly (in Sellarsian terms it is »non-inferential«). There is a difference between 
inferring that something is the case and, for instance, seeing it to be the case. It must be empha-
sized, however, that the direct/indirect distinction is noncontroversial on the level of ordinary 
language, but as a component of professional epistemological discourse, the distinction seems 
to be questionable. As an epistemological category, the given should explicate the fact that the 
empirical knowledge rests on the foundation of non-inferential, and thus immediate, matter-of-
fact knowledge. This is, however, what Sellars finds impossible. Those who are influenced by the 
Myth of the Given confuse two different things when they refer to immediacy. It might be said 
that there are two senses of immediacy. According to Sellars »S knows p directly« is ambiguous, 
with two possible readings: (1) S knows p without inferring p from anything else. It means that 
there is no causal intermediary between S and p, where a causal intermediary can be things that, 
for example, detect properties we could not otherwise observe. (2) S knows p and p is justified for 
S independently of anything else S knows. To say that p is directly justified or known is then to 
say that it requires no further premises to be derived from. Such directly known premises, if there 
are any, would be self-evident. In other words, there is no justificatory intermediary that S knows 
p.4 
 Sensory impressions can be known directly in sense (1) but not in sense (2). These two senses 
in which knowledge can be direct – the causal sense and the justificatory sense – have often been 
confused. We can obviously think that experiencing a specific set of sensations is a direct cause 
of a person’s knowledge of a particular physical object or event. This is probably the reason why 
some philosophers have held that these sensations constitute a body of evidence that also serves 
as a justificatory intermediary for such knowledge. Crucially, however, evidence itself can justify 
only if it is known. It does not follow that what serves as the direct cause of knowledge must itself 
be directly known. According to Sellars, empiricism, which generates the Myth of the Given, is 
based on misunderstandings about the nature of justification and the nature of sensory experience. 
Sensory experiences are objects or events in a way that a table or a rainbow is an object or an event. 
Because sensing particulars (having sense impressions) is non-epistemic and non-inferential, sen-
sory experiences are not judgments and they don’t have a propositional form. As such, a sensory 
experience cannot secure premises or reasons in an argument any more than a table or a rainbow 
could. Only truth-evaluable propositions can have a positive epistemic status. A sensory experience 
may be necessary for acquiring perceptual knowledge, but it is not itself a primitive kind of know-
ing. Those who are under the spell of the Myth of the Given confuse the realm of causes with the 
realm of reasons.5
 Sellars’s master argument that the Given is a Myth focuses on the two requirements: (1) that 
the knowledge of the Given is epistemically independent of all other knowledge and (2) that it is 
epistemically efficacious, i. e. it can justify or provide an epistemic support for all other empirical 
knowledge. 6 According to Sellars, the given element in experience must be either something non-
propositional (e. g. a sense datum) or something propositional (e. g. the first principle). If it is non-
propositional, it cannot serve as a premise or a reason in an argument, because only truth-evaluable 
things with a propositional form can have a positive epistemic status, as we noted before. Suppose 
4 Ibid., 15–17. For A more detailed discussion see Willem A. Devries, Timm Triplett, Knowledge, Mind 
and the Given. Reading Wilfrid Sellars’s »Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind«, Indianapolis 2000, 
6 –16.
5 Cf., Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 21–22.
6 Cf., Devries, Triplett, Knowledge, Mind and the Given, XXXI–XXXII.
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that the given is propositional. Whatever is propositional can be epistemically efficacious, but it 
cannot be epistemically independent. Any proposition within an epistemic system must either be 
the result of an inferential process, or not. If it is inferential, then it is epistemically dependent on 
those premises from which it has been inferred. Even the putative non-inferential presupposition, 
for example »This is green«, can have a positive epistemic status only if there are other proposi-
tions that support it. So we cannot know the truth of the observation report »This is green« if we 
are just capable of reliably producing such reports. We must know that our reports are reliable, but 
then our knowledge of our reliability supports our observational knowledge, which therefore can-
not be epistemically independent. Hence nothing propositional can be epistemically independent, 
and since the non-propositional can be a given as well, then nothing can be a given.
 I think Sellars’s attack on the Myth of the Given is by nature Hegelian, and it can be compared 
with the first three chapters of Phenomenology of Spirit. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
Sellars mentions Hegel four times or so and with a bit of distance calls his own reflections »Medi-
tations Hegeliènnes«. It might be said that for Sellars Hegel was an exemplary critic of the Myth of 
the Given.
 In Chapter I, »Sense-certainty« (die sinnliche Gewissheit), Hegel claims that the sense-cer-
taintist (for example, Russell with his appeal to acquaintance, we could say) thinks of what is 
immediately given as »the truest knowledge« and as »the richest kind of knowledge«. The objects 
of sense-certainty are meant to be things given immediately in experience, and are meant to be 
given as the singular referents of a type of mental demonstrative – each presented as a »pure This« 
(reines Dieses). But Hegel writes »An actual sense – certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, 
but an instance (or an example [Beispiel]) of it«7. Anything purportedly present to us »as a bare 
this is nevertheless present as an instance of the determination of singularity, an exemplification of 
»thisness« in general. Consider an example Hegel gave. Asked what is now, we shall answer, for 
instance, »Now is night«. We write down this truth. If now, at noon, we look at the truth we have 
written down, we shall see that this truth vanishes. Indeed, the »now« remains, but as something 
that is not night any more. Also in relation to the day that it is at present, the now is something that 
is not the day, which entails that the now is generally something negative. The »now« which still 
continues is then not something immediate, but something mediated. A similar example could be 
encountered in sections 14–16 Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind concerning John, a necktie 
salesman. John has to learn to cope with the fact that new electric lighting has been installed in the 
tie-shop, and that ties, which seen in daylight appear blue, when seen in the shop he calls green. 
When the customer asks for »this green tie«, John’s answer is: »It is not green. It looks green, but 
take it outside and see. In fact, it is blue«. Sellars claims that statements such as »This is green« 
have both a fact-stating and a reporting use. Once John learns to stifle the report »This necktie is 
green« when looking at it in the shop, there is no other report about colour and the necktie that he 
knows how to make. To be sure, John says »This tie is blue«, but he is not making a reporting use 
of this sentence. He uses it as the conclusion of an inference. The concept of being green or blue 
involves knowing in what circumstances to view an object to ascertain its colour. Sellars argues 
that to say that a certain experience is a seeing that something is the case is to do more than describe 
the experience. »It is to characterize it as, so to speak, making an assertion or claim, and – which is 
the point I wish to stress – to endorse that claim«.8 
 Let me return to Hegel, especially to his notion of the determinate negation. The collapse of 
sense-certainty as a cognitive attitude will result in its being replaced by a new shape of con-
sciousness, »perception« (die Wahrnehmung). The object of perception is »the thing with many 
properties«. In the first instance, says Hegel, the properties will be taken as simply inhering in the 
7 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1977, § 92 (3.83).
8 Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 39.
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medium in a way that makes them »indifferent« to each other, but if all such properties were in 
fact »indifferent« to each other in this way, they could not be determinate »for they are only deter-
minate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others 
as to their opposites«. Hegel writes: »white is white only in opposition to [in Entgegensetzung 
gegen] black, and so on«.9 The very existence of things determinately coloured A presupposes 
the existence of things determinately coloured non – A. The point of singularity, therefore, must 
»radiate forth into plurality«. In his critique of the »given« Hegel insists that an individual as such 
is grasped in terms of the categorical determinacy of »singularity«, and that that category, as a 
concept, is to be understood in terms of its relations to other categories such as particularity and 
universality.
2.
In the second part of my presentation I would like to pay attention to the other Hegelian strand in 
contemporary analytic philosophy that is connected with Sellars’s attack on the Myth of the Given. 
I mean here John McDowell and his book Mind and World (1994). McDowell does not want to 
succumb to the Myth of the Given, but at the same time he discerns a risk in embracing an equally 
problematic conception of the spontaneity of concept application, in which «exercises of concepts 
threaten to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game«.10 He sums up the central dilemma of 
the recent debate in analytic philosophy, emphasizing a tendency to interminably oscillate between 
two opposed and equally untenable positions: »on the one side a coherentism that threatens to dis-
connect thought from reality, and on the other side a vain appeal to the Given, in the sense of bare 
presences that are supposed to constitute the ultimate grounds of empirical judgments«.11 He calls 
the latter position the epistemological fundamentalism. McDowell wants not so much to solve the 
dilemma as to evade it. In this evasion he is aided by Kant and Hegel. 
 Sellars and Davidson, who can also be seen as another critic of the Given, have shown that 
the idea of the non-conceptual given is useless for explicating how extra-conceptual and extra-
linguistic elements can get in the space of reasons and serve as presuppositions for inferences. 
According to McDowell’s reading, the idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the 
space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. But when we 
accept that the realm of reasons is more extensive than the conceptual sphere, the result is a picture 
in which constraint from outside is exerted at the outer boundary of the expanded space of reasons, 
in what we are committed to describing as a direct impact from the exterior. This picture ensures 
that we cannot be blamed for what happens at that outer boundary and for the inward influence of 
what happens there. This slightly Fichtean depiction culminates in a conclusion that the idea of the 
Given offers excuses (exculpations) where we wanted justification.12 If we want to be answerable 
to experienced reality, we must reinterpret our notion of experience; we need to recognize that 
experiences themselves are states or occurrences that inextricably combine receptivity and spon-
taneity. This leads us to Kant’s philosophy, which is the first challenge to the Myth of the Given. 
His notion of experience makes it possible to avoid another risk, different from that of the Myth of 
the Given, namely, the coherentism that disconnects thought from reality. As Davidson expressed 
it, the only thing capable of justifying a belief is another belief. From the standpoint of experience, 
Kant did not conceive of intuitions as making a separable contribution to the co-operation between 
  9 Hegel , Phenomenology of Spirit, § 120 (3.100).
10 John McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge 2003, 5.
11 Ibid., 24.
12 Cf., ibid., 8.
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receptivity and spontaneity (= the involvement of conceptual capacities), and thus for him »expe-
rience does not take in ultimate grounds that we could appeal to by pointing outside the sphere of 
thinkable content. In experience we take in, through impacts on the senses, elements in a reality 
that is precisely not outside the sphere of thinkable content«.13 But Kant avoids the Myth of the 
Given, as it were, at the cost of the given, because in his transcendental perspective, »receptivity 
figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be 
independent of our conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any that fits the ordinary empirical 
world«.14 In short, the Ding an sich is what is given. In this context, post-Kantian philosophical de-
bates on the concept of the-thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) seem to be relevant to analytic philosophy. 
 It is very important how we understand »co-operation« between receptivity and spontaneity. 
According to McDowell, it is wrong to think that receptivity can be sharply distinguished from 
spontaneity in such a way that it is the source for non-conceptual data and that this receptivity is 
only conceptualized when spontaneity comes into play. Rather, the conceptual capacities are al-
ways already drawn on in receptivity. Pure receptivity that is free from all involvement of concep-
tual capacities is a fiction. As Brandom emphasizes, »anything that does not have concepts does not 
have perceptual experiences« and conversely »anything that does not have perceptual experience 
does not have concepts either«.15 In fact, «one must already have concepts in order to have experi-
ence». Hence, «concept use and perceptual experience are two aspects of one achievement«.16 
 McDowell points to Hegel, whose critique of Kant was entirely different from those of Fichte or 
Jacobi. Generally speaking, for him Hegel’s response to the myth of the given is more to the point. 
Towards the end of Lecture II of Mind and World, McDowell seems to approximate Hegel, when 
he notes that »it is central to Absolute Idealism to reject the idea that conceptual realm has an outer 
boundary, and we have arrived at a point from which we could start to domesticate the rhetoric of 
that philosophy. Consider, for instance, this remark of Hegel’s: ›In thinking, I am free, because I 
am not in an other‹«.17 This expresses exactly the image McDowell has been using, in which there 
is nothing outside the conceptual. He compares Hegel’s remark to the following remark of Witt-
genstein from Philosophical Investigations: »When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the 
case, we – and our meaning – do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this–is–so«.18 
Wittgenstein calls this a paradox, because »thought can be of what is not the case«. But at the same 
time he says that the remark has the form of a truism. What is crucial here is that for Wittgenstein 
there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be 
the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. Since the world is everything 
that is the case, as Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Tractatus, there is no gap between thought, 
as such, and the world. But to say this is, for McDowell, just to dress up a truism in high-flown 
language. One can think, for instance, that spring has begun, and that very same thing, that spring 
has begun, can be the case. But this is a truism and it cannot embody something metaphysically 
contentious, like slighting the independence of reality. The high-flown language is, for example, 
the statement that the world is made up of the sort of thing one can think. This formulation can 
make people suspect we are renouncing the independence of reality – as if the world were for us a 
shadow of our thinking or even were made of the same mental stuff. Yet according to McDowell, 
we might just as well take the fact that the sort of thing one can think is the same as the sort of thing 
13 Ibid., 41.
14 Ibid., 41.
15 Robert Brandom, »Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities«, in 
Reading McDowell:On Mind and World. Edited by Nicholas H. Smith, London, New York 2002, 93. 
16 Ibid., 93. 
17 McDowell, Mind and World, 44.
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 95.
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that can be the case as an invitation to understand the notion of the thinkable in terms of a suppos-
edly prior understanding of the sort of thing that can be the case. In fact there is no reason to look 
for a priority in either direction.19
 This is what McDowell sees as Hegel’s merit. Indeed, he has also been accused of slighting 
reality, but it does not amount to anything »metaphysically contentious«. It is contentious if the 
relation between thought and the world is considered in one direction only. McDowell speaks about 
Hegel’s conception of the »equipoise« between thought and its subject matter. In other words, if 
judgment can be rationally constrained in empirical experience, it must be the case that what does 
the constraining is both worldly and conceptual, and it was Hegel who provided a way of thinking 
on how this can be so.
 In opposition to Sellars and Davidson, who insist that we cannot take experience to be episte-
mologically significant except by falling into Myth of the Given, McDowell claims that we should 
not renounce empiricism. We can make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking, but 
only by conceiving it as answerable to the empirical world for its correctness. It is precisely what 
he calls »a minimal empiricism«. It is the idea that experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating 
the way our thinking is answerable to how things are. The conception of experience as a tribunal is 
the normative account of experience in which it can play a role in justification. According to Mc-
Dowell, Sellars and Davidson renounce empiricism because they renounce the idea of experience 
as a tribunal. But McDowell thinks that this rejection of empiricism will not work. He thinks that 
doing so will leave the traditional philosophical questions still looking as if they ought to be good 
ones. Modern philosophy since Descartes has operated in a framework in which we distinguish 
what is out there from what is somehow in our minds. This metaphor of what is »inside« and »out-
side« is also present in our everyday language. McDowell wants to show how deeply misleading 
this picture is, and how it ensnares us in all sorts of pseudo-problems.20
 According to him, we can find a perspective that eschews the deceptive division into the »in-
side« and the »outside«. And he finds it in the conception of a second nature, according to which 
the acquisition of a moral character and the acquisition of the ability to have perceptual experiences 
are both examples of initiation into conceptual capacities. McDowell says:
»Such initiation is a normal part of what it is for a human being to come to maturity, and 
that is why, although the structure of the space of reasons is alien to the layout of nature con-
ceived as the realm of law, it does not take on the remoteness from the human that rampant 
Platonism envisages. If we generalize the way Aristotle conceives the moulding of ethical 
character, we arrive at a notion of having one’s eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring 
a second nature. I cannot think of a good short English expression for this, but it is what 
figures in German philosophy as Bildung«.21 
The concept of a second nature (Bildung) thus holds, generally speaking, that the shape of our 
experience, and consequently also of our knowledge, is influenced not only by stimuli from the 
outside, but also by our breeding, milieu, language and tradition. Briefly: by what we call culture, 
which Hegel called Bildung. All these factors co-mould our perception of the world. Empirical 
knowledge, like experience itself, thus becomes something that is historically, culturally, and in 
a sense also socially, mediated. Hence empirical knowledge remains subject to changes and pos-
sible corrections. McDowell’s reference to the German tradition of Bildung can also be read as a 
Hegelian trace, a »domestication of Hegel« as McDowell himself called it. And that is why it is not 
19 Cf., Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, New York 2007, 51. 
20 Cf., Richard J. Berstein, »McDowell’s Domesticated Hegelianism«, in Reading McDowell, 15.
21 McDowelll, Mind and World, 84.
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surprising that in his Preface to Mind and World McDowell writes: »I would like to conceive this 
work as a prolegomenon to a reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit«.22 
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